Lonely Outpost, Reluctant Nation: A Snapshot of Race, Empire and Isolation in the Interwar Years

To Edmund Leolin Piesse, this isolation represented an unacknowledged threat to Australia. A foreign policy analyst and lawyer, Piesse was actively critical of Australian foreign policy in the Pacific through the interwar years, developing a near-obsession with the Australian relationship to Japan.[2] A member of the Round Table group, the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and the Institute of Pacific relations, Piesse wrote prolifically on the topics of defence and foreign policy. Although dismissive of the Japanese threat to Australia through the 1920s, Piesse came to the belief that the Japanese imperialism of the early 1930s alongside the waning strength of the British Empire indicated “renewed danger for Australia.”[3]

Notably, Piesse was critical of the White Australia Policy — although on purely pragmatic grounds. Cognizant of the potential threat of Japan in the Pacific, had advocated for the removal of barriers against Japanese immigration and trade since the end of the Great War, but his advocacy largely fell on deaf ears.[4] Through his membership of the Round Table group, Piesse published a memorandum for the British Commonwealth Relations Conference of 1933 on ‘Australia’s Interest in Foreign Affairs.’ In it, Piesse argued that, given continued English weakness, it would be in “Australia’s own interest” to avoid “provocation of other countries by undue restriction of their nationals and their trade.”[5] It was clearly not Piesse’s intent to remove the White Australia Policy altogether — indeed, the concessions he advocated for here and elsewhere are explicitly designed to ensure the “maintenance” of the Policy.[6]

Piesse was not alone in his comprehension of the threat posed by Japan to Australia and the British Empire. Viscount John Jellicoe, former First Naval Lord of the British Admiralty, had toured the Dominions in 1919 and compiled a report on the naval defence of the Empire. In it, he identified Japan  as “the only nation in the Far East, except the United States, which would be in a position to inflict any permanent injury on the British Empire.”[7] Jellicoe likewise warned of the “strong possibility of future trouble” if the Australian government continued to exclude Japanese immigration and trade.[8] The Swinburne Committee, formed to advise on Australian defence policy following the War, also reported “that Japan was the only possible foe.”[9] The potential threat of Japan remained a consistent element of Australian Army reports through the 1920s and ‘30s — and was consistently sidelined by successive Australian governments.[10]

An illuminating example of Australia’s view of its place in the world is the writing of Sir William Harrison Moore in The Christian Science Monitor. Moore, a dedicated academic and constitutional lawyer, possessed an avid interest in Imperial Relations and was the Australian representative at the Operation of Dominion Legislation Conference in 1929 which would lead to the Statute of Westminster.[11] Moore’s article formed part of a series of articles in the Monitor discussing “The British Empire of 1930.” In artfully circumspect language, Moore describes an isolationist, inwardly-focused Australia that rejects foreign influence on its “domestic jurisdiction.”[12] The most important issues to Australia - in Moore’s eyes - were the continuation of the Empire, the loosening of trade tariffs, and continued military cooperation between Britain and the Dominions.

This focus on trade in Australian foreign policy is affirmed by John Greig Latham, Leader of the Opposition, in the article alongside, which emphasizes that “the people of Australia have little direct interest” in the legal status of the Australian Commonwealth and “a very active interest” in trade relations with the rest of the Empire.[13]

Both Moore and Piesse express anxiety about the continuation of the British Empire. Piesse stresses that, having “asserted… practical independence… and followed their own course,” the Dominions may not be able to rely on England for defence as readily as they could in the past.[14] Moore, meanwhile, expressed the “strongest conviction” that the “sound health of the British Empire” meant “the sound health… of world peace.”[15] Australia delayed adopting the Statute of Westminster until 1942, when it “quietly” passed the legislation in order to allow for wartime measures.[16] The fears expressed by both Piesse and Moore were shared by Australian politicians and formed a significant part of the reason behind the Australian delay — that legally recognizing that Britain and the Dominions were of equal status would result in the dissolution of the Empire.[17]

In writing such a short piece, my intent was to provide a small snapshot of Australia in the Asia-Pacific. By examining the period through two publications from University of Melbourne academics, we have only really seen some of the views and opinions of the ‘intellectual elite.’ While those align with what history has interpreted as the views of the ‘political elite,’ we have gained little insight into those of the public. As E. M. Andrews notes, Australian education “lagged behind world standards” in the interwar years, and the “informed electorate” we take for granted these days was non-existent.[18] Understanding public opinion in this context is more difficult, especially without the existence of widespread opinion polling in Australia until the 1940s.[19] However, it is my hope that the two documents highlighted here will provide some measure of insight into the place of Australia in the Asia-Pacific during the 1930s — the growing fears of the elite over the crumbling power of the British Empire; the dogged xenophobia that hamstrung Australian foreign policy and left it isolated in this “strange sea”; and the Imperial obsession that left it tied to England even as the other Dominions were cutting themselves loose.