Australian Responses to the Santa Cruz Massacre in East Timor
The conflict in East Timor
The conflict in East Timor spanned 24 years, from the Indonesian invasion in 1975 until independence was achieved in 1999. The early years of the occupation were met with determined resistance from the East Timorese political party Fretilin, and their armed wing Falintil, however an orchestrated famine that killed nearly one quarter of the population weakened the resistance.[1] Throughout the occupation the people of East Timor – resistance members and civilians alike – were subjected to a brutal regime, including arbitrary violence, torture, displacement, sexual crimes and executions.[2] Very little information about the Indonesian presence made it out of East Timor during the first 14 years of occupation, as the territory was closed to foreigners until 1989.[3] This allowed successive Australian governments to follow a ‘narrative of denial’ that depicted the Indonesian annexation as ‘regrettable’ but ‘irreversible’.[4] Besides the radio connection from the resistance in Dili with activists in Darwin Australia, most information was smuggled out through the Catholic Church network, however this rarely made front page news in Australia.[5] By and large, the world was unaware of the extent of the atrocities committed by the Indonesian military. After the Santa Cruz massacre, this was no longer the case.[6]
The Santa Cruz Massacre
At the Santa Cruz cemetery on 12 November 1991, over 270 civilians, children, young students and clandestine resistance members were killed when the Indonesian military opened fire on a peaceful protest.[7] This massacre was the first to be caught on film by foreign journalists, who had been present at the protest. The footage captured by Max Stahl was broadcast across the world.[8] East Timor became a major news story, bringing about public awareness of the conflict. As well as the footage, the death of Australian-Malaysian student and interpreter Kamal Bamadhajsparked a wave of international solidarity, both at the diplomatic level and within activist groups.[9]
David Scott
Despite the Australian government’s complicit response to the invasion, activists such as David Scott were determined to help see the small nation gain independence. Scott devoted much of his life to the East Timor issue. After leaving Dili just before the Indonesian invasion at the instruction of the Australian government, Scott organised to have diplomatic leaders of the newly declared Democratic Republic of East Timor flown out of the territory on the eve of the invasion.[10] This undoubtedly saved the lives of key figures in East Timor’s struggle for Independence, including Fretilin Minister of Foreign Affairs Jose Ramos Horta (and later Nobel Peace Prize co-winner and Prime Minister of East Timor).[11] Upon returning to Australia from East Timor, Scott left his post as head of the Brotherhood of St Laurence and Community Aid Abroad (later OXFAM Australia), and focused his efforts on the East Timorese struggle for independence.[12] He founded the Australia-East Timor Association in 1975, which saw Scott accompanying Ramos Horta to campaign for the East Timor cause at the United Nations.[13] The David Scott Archives, available at the University of Melbourne, are a collection of communication including solidarity pamphlets, newspaper clippings, correspondence with activists, letters to Australian government officials, photographs from East Timor, amongst other material. With Scott’s role as an activist and lobbyer for the East Timor issue, the material is undoubtedly political in nature and represents Australian activism and solidarity efforts to support the East Timorese struggle.
Australian Government responses to the Santa Cruz massacre
Although solidarity for East Timor was present in activist circles prior to the massacre, after the Santa Cruz massacre public opinion began to reflect such views too.[14] However, this was not the case for Australia’s foreign policy. Although Prime Minister Bob Hawke condemned the killings, the official response of the Australian government was to ‘play down’ the whole affair, with Foreign Minister Gareth Evans stating it was carried out by “an aberration” of the Indonesian military “not an act of state policy”.[15] An Indonesian inquiry into the killings was demanded by the Hawke government.[16] The report that was released stated that only 50 people had been confirmed killed, and that the attack was provoked by protestors which caused the Indonesian military to react in such a violent way.[17] Foreign minister Evans and the new Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating “praised the report as credible and encouraging” despite conflicting eye-witness reports from a number of East Timorese civilians and foreign journalists.[18]
The Age cartoons
The cartoons above are demonstrative of the public dissatisfaction felt with the Australian government’s response to the Santa Cruz massacre. Published only two days after the Santa Cruz Massacre, Tanner responded directly to the Indonesian government’s crackdown on mourners at the Santa Cruz cemetery, with a ridiculously threatening cannon facing one timid mourner saying “Stop that aggressive grief”. Here, Tanner is mocking the Indonesian version of events – that the protesters provoked the attack – clearly demonstrating the incredulity of such a claim. The accompanying opinion article by Mark Baker states “The Dili massacre has exposed in an unequivocal way the brutal reality of what has been happening in the former Portuguese territory for 16 years – and the transparency of efforts by successive Australian governments to ignore or dismiss that reality in the quest for a harmonious relationship with Indonesia”.[19] Tanner and Baker highlight the emphasis placed on bilateral relations with Indonesia, at the expense of the human rights of the East Timorese.
Nicholson takes a similarly sarcastic approach in his cartoon of Prime minister Bob Hawke and foreign minister Gareth Evans. Published 18 days after the massacre, the Australian politicians are being asked by an optometrist to read signs that say “Help fight for Self-Determination” rising out of East Timor on a world map. They are unable to read the words, reflecting the hypocrisy of the Australian government in purporting to support the right to self-determination, but failing to help East Timor achieve this right.
Australia and the Asia Pacific
The cartoons are also demonstrative of the priority that the Australian government placed upon bilateral relations with Indonesia, and the importance of creating an alliance with its ASEAN neighbours. In the post-cold war era, Australia had its sights set on becoming a significant power in Asia and the Pacific.[20] Suharto and the New Order Regime’s anti-communist and pro-western attitude “suited Australia’s strategic interests”.[21] Having good relations with Indonesia was Australia’s ‘foot in the door’ to the Asia and Pacific region.[22] When considering the 24-year conflict in East Timor, it is obvious that policies ensuring strong bilateral relations with Indonesia took priority over policies supporting East Timor’s right to self-determination, as well as the safety and lives of the East Timorese people.[23]
[1] Clinton Fernandes, “The Nineteen-Eighties - A Little Known Decade,” in The Independence of East Timor : Multi-Dimensional Perspectives - Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism, The Sussex Library of Asian Studies. Sussex Academic Press, 2011, 66.
[2] Jim Aubrey, “Canberra: Jakarta’s Trojan Horse in East Timor,” in The East Timor Question: The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia, edited by Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey, I.B. Tauris, 2000, 140.
[3] John Waddingham, “Occupation and Resistance: Primary Sources in East Timor History 1975-1989,” in Timor Leste Studies Association Conference Proceedings 2015, Vol. 2. UNTL Liceu Campus, Dili, Timor-Leste: Swinburne Press, 2015, 1.
[4] Peter Job, “The Evolving Narrative of Denial: The Fraser Government and the Timorese Genocide, 1975–1980.” Critical Asian Studies50, no. 3 (2018): 444.
[5] Rodney Tiffen, “The Politics of Inevitability 1975-1991,” in Diplomatic Deceits : Government, Media and East Timor, UNSW Press, 2001, 27–28.
[6] Peter Britton, “East Timor - Supporting Self-Determination,” in Working for the World - The Evolution of Australian Volunteers International, North Melbourne: Australian Scholaraly Publishing Pty Ltd, 2019, 242.
[7] “Chega! The Final Report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR),” Jakarta: KPG in cooperation with STP-CAVR, 2013, 267.
[8] Geoffrey C. Gunn, “The Dili Massacre and Aftermath,” in A Critical View of Western Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor, Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers, 1994, 176.
[9]Britton, “East Timor - Supporting Self-Determination,” 242.
[10] David Scott, Last Flight Out of Dili, North Melbourne: Pluto Press Australia, 2005, 26.
[11]Scott, Last Flight Out of Dili, 26.
[14] Clinton Fernandes, “Santa Cruz and Its Aftermath,” in The Independence of East Timor : Multi-Dimensional Perspectives - Occupation, Resistance, and International Political Activism, The Sussex Library of Asian Studies, Sussex Academic Press, 2011, 98.
[15]Gunn, “The Dili Massacre,” 183; Fernandes, “Santa Cruz and Its Aftermath,” 97.
[16]Gunn, “The Dili Massacre,” 183.
[17]“Chega! The Final Report of the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR),” 267; Rodney Tiffen, “The Issue That Would Not Die - After The Dili Massacre,” in Diplomatic Deceits: Government, Media and East Timor, UNSW Press, 2001, 48.
[18]Tiffen, “The Issue That Would Not Die - After The Dili Massacre,” 48.
[19] Mark Baker, “A Blind Policy’s Dead End in Dili,” The Age, p. 13, November 15, 1991, sec. Opinion & Analysis, David Scott Archives.
[20] Job, “The Evolving Narrative of Denial,” 443.
[21] David Goldsworthy, “Regional Relations,” in Facing North : A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, edited by David Goldsworthy, Melbourne University Press, 2001, 155.
[22] Job, “The Evolving Narrative of Denial,” 444.
[23] Tiffen, “The Politics of Inevitability,” 39; Aubrey, “Canberra: Jakarta’s Trojan Horse in East Timor,” 136.