Indonesia’s Struggle for Independence and the Reconfiguration of Australian Identity

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A 1945 Communist Party of Australia pamphlet outlining the situation in Indonesia to an Australian audience [cover].

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Baron von Aerssen, the Dutch Minister in Australia, warns of the deterioration of Dutch-Australia relations if the trade union 'black ban' on Dutch shipping to Indonesia continues.

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Terrence Gordon, the secretary of the Ship Painters’ and Dockers’ Union, responds to von Aerssen's complaints by explaining that future relations with Indonesia mattered more to Australians than did relations with the Dutch.

Yowhans Kidane

On 17 August 1945, two days after the surrender of the occupying Japanese to the Allies, Indonesia, which had long suffered under the yoke of foreign rulers, announced its independence. Not surprisingly, their former colonial masters, that is the Dutch, whom the Japanese had ousted from Indonesia in 1942, did not take kindly to Indonesia’s declaration of independence. With WWII having drawn to a close, the Dutch would, with the support of the British and remaining Japanese forces, look to re-establish their rule over the Indonesian archipelago, a decision which sparked a bloody conflict with pro-independence forces.[1]

As a British settler colony comprised mostly of Anglo-Celtic peoples, Australia had close affinities with Britain and Europe more broadly. The fall of Singapore in 1942 would, however, precipitate a marked shift in attitudes towards Britain. The failure of the so-called ‘Singapore Strategy,’ which left Australia exposed to a potential Japanese invasion, gave rise to feelings of betrayal among Australians, who were of the view that the British had callously left them to their fate.[2] Though WWII would pass without any attempts by the Japanese to invade Australia, this resentment did not subside and would feed into a desire, on the part of Australians, to assert their independence vis-à-vis Britain and Europe.

The dispute surrounding Indonesia would prove to be Australia’s first test. Was Australia to side with its traditional but distant European allies in their efforts to reassert control over Indonesia, or was it to support the political aspirations of its potentially powerful neighbour, that is the Indonesian republic? This question was informed by a more profound question which penetrated to the core of Australian identity. In short, was Australia an island of Europeans in Asia or part and parcel of Asia? Particularly illuminating on this score are the materials of the Victorian branch of the Australian-Indonesian Association, assembled by W.J. Morrison, a member of the Communist Party of Australia [CPA], and later deposited to the University of Melbourne Archives. These materials reflect the growing desire among Australians to both integrate into the Asia region and pursue that which was in the national interest.

It is essential to note in passing that history, or archival research, “is not merely a project of fact-retrieval.”[3] Of central importance is the dual screening process which underlays the creation of archives, because while the archivist is pivotal to the construction of the archives, the materials are sourced from individuals who have, in compiling these sources, gone through a complex and deliberate process of selection which follows a certain logic. As such, though the materials collated by Morrison do not contain a great deal by way of that which would traditionally be considered archival materials, the pamphlets and newspaper clippings available in this collection do nevertheless reveal the sentiments of Morrison, as a CPA member, and the Australian-Indonesian Association more broadly, during a critical juncture in Australia-Asia relations.

Believing that supplies aboard Dutch ships destined for Indonesia were going to aid in the crushing of the nascent Indonesian Republic, on 23 September 1945, Indonesian workers on four Dutch vessels docked in Sydney went on strike. These Indonesian workers sought the help of Australian union officials, in this case, Jim Healy, the secretary of the CPA affiliated Waterside Workers Federation [WWF], who sympathized with the plight of the Indonesian people and subsequently pledged his support for the strike. Healy asserted that "in view of the declaration of the World Federation of Trade Unions and the United Nation Federation it [WWF] would not be a party to assisting in the suppression” of the Indonesian government.[4] Healy’s show of solidarity marked the beginning of the ‘black ban’ which lasted, off and on, until the Dutch officially recognized the Indonesian republic in 1949. Encompassing unions and workers all across the east coast of Australia, the ‘black ban’ hindered Dutch efforts to transport materials destined for use in the war against the Indonesian republic.[5] The heavily involved CPA outlined the basis of its support for the budding Indonesian Republic in the above pamphlet titled “Hands off the Indonesian Republic.”[6]

The arguments posed in this pamphlet were not explicitly directed at Communists but rather at Australians more generally. For example, the broadly relatable conceptual edifice of the Allied war effort, the Atlantic Charter, was employed to justify Indonesia’s right to self-determination.[7] More pertinently, the pamphlet attempts to tap into existing resentment towards the British and what was then a pervasive anti-Japanese sentiment. The pamphlet makes mention, for example, of how Java was still under the control of the “Japs,” in collaboration with the British who were awaiting the return of the Dutch.[8] In other words, the nation which represented a mortal threat to Australia during WWII, that is Japan, was oppressing the Indonesian people with the ascent of the participating British who likewise wronged Australia during WWII. By framing the issue in this manner, the CPA aimed to cultivate solidarity between Australians and Indonesians based on their shared animosity towards both the Japanese and British. The pamphlet ends by asserting that the Indonesians were merely asking for the freedoms which Australians already enjoy, that is “the right to organise in political parties, and trade unions, and the right of free speech, press and assembly.”[9]

The Dutch were offended both by the rhetoric and refusal of the Australian labour movement, in this case, to facilitate the transportation of Dutch supplies to Indonesia. Baron von Aerssen, the Dutch Minister in Australia, was bewildered by why the Australians, who had fought side by side with the Dutch during WWII, were so hostile to their interests in Indonesia. He went so far as to describe Australia’s treatment of the Dutch as “an insult to the comradeship in arms and detrimental to the future relations between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Commonwealth of Australia.”[10] What von Aerssen failed to understand however was that the prospect of an independent Indonesia, and all which that would entail, mattered more to the Australians than did the goodwill of the distant Dutch.

The shift in Australia’s priorities was underscored by Terrence Gordon, the then secretary of the Ship Painters’ and Dockers’ Union, in his response to von Aerssen. As Gordon candidly put it, “Australia could not afford to insult 72 million Indonesian neighbours whom, he felt sure, would soon be granted independence”.[11] Gordon framed worker support for the Indonesian republic not in terms of proletarian internationalism but rather the national interest. For example, Gordon stressed that “the union would not assist in the repression of the Indonesian Government, especially as there would be an enormous potential market for Australian goods when the Indonesian Government raised the standard of living far above that under the Dutch”.[12] Gordon also envisaged a defence alliance between Australia and Indonesia, believing that the latter could “be a powerful ally to Australia if an invasion attempt were made on our shores in the future”.[13] It was thus, Gordon contends, “in the interests of every Australia that friendly, not hostile relations should be established with the Indonesian people’s government.”[14]

The conscious process of source selection, which underlay Morrison’s deliberate construction of this particular collection, underscores his efforts to convey the reorientation of Australia away from Europe and towards Asia. Although we have broadly focused on the labour movement, such shifts were also visible at the highest echelons of Australian foreign policy, which displayed similar concerns to those of Gordon, thus highlighting the diffusion of these sentiments.[15]

[1] Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12.

[2] Malcolm Murfett, "An Enduring Theme: The Singapore Strategy," in A Great Betrayal?: The Fall of Singapore Revisited, eds. Brian Farrell and Sandy Hunter (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2010), 17.

[3] Antoinette Burton, "Introduction: Archive Fever, Archive Stories," in Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History, ed. Antoinette Burton (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 7-8.

[4] "Sydney Boycott of Dutch Ships," Barrier Miner, September 24, 1945, https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/50008761.

[5] Rupert Lockwood, Black Armada (Sydney: Australasian Book Society, 1975), 5-6, 294-295.

[6] One of the more active trade unions on this particular issue, alongside the WWF, was the Seamen's Union of Australia [SUA] which also had close links to the CPA.

[7] University of Melbourne Archives, Australian-Indonesian Association, Victorian Branch Collection, 1967.0013, File 3/9, CPA Pamphlet: “Hands off the Indonesian Republic,” 1945.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] University of Melbourne Archives, Australian-Indonesian Association, Victorian Branch Collection, 1967.0013, File 4/1, “Threat' to Dutch Relations,” 12 June 1946.

[11] University of Melbourne Archives, Australian-Indonesian Association, Victorian Branch Collection, 1967.0013, File 4/1, The Herald: “Can't Insult 72 Million Indonesians” - Union Reply,” 13 June 1946.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] For a discussion of this, see Margaret George, Australia and the Indonesian Revolution (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980), 40-46.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Barrier Miner. "Sydney Boycott of Dutch Ships." September 24, 1945. https://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/50008761.

University of Melbourne Archives, Australian-Indonesian Association, Victorian Branch Collection, 1967.0013, File 3/9, CPA Pamphlet: “Hands off the Indonesian Republic,” 1945.

University of Melbourne Archives, Australian-Indonesian Association, Victorian Branch Collection, 1967.0013, File 4/1, The Herald: “Can't Insult 72 Million Indonesians” - Union Reply,” 13 June 1946.

University of Melbourne Archives, Australian-Indonesian Association, Victorian Branch Collection, 1967.0013, File 4/1, “Threat' to Dutch Relations,” 12 June 1946.

Secondary Sources

Vickers, Adrian. A History of Modern Indonesia. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Burton, Antoinette. “Introduction: Archive Fever, Archive Stories.” In Archive Stories: Facts, Fictions, and the Writing of History, edited by Antoinette Burton, 1-24. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.

George, Margaret. Australia and the Indonesian Revolution. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1980.

Lockwood, Rupert. Black Armada. Sydney: Australasian Book Society, 1975.

Murfett, Malcolm. "An Enduring Theme: The Singapore Strategy." In A Great Betrayal?: The Fall of Singapore Revisited, edited by Brian Farrell and Sandy Hunter, 1-19. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2010.